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 The Loving Analogy: 
Race and the Early Same-Sex Marriage Debate 
 The American legal system is based in precedent and legal scholars often 
rely upon a series of analogies in order to discuss and conceptualize the expansion 
of equal protection to minority groups. In the early legal discourse surrounding 
same-sex marriage scholars, activists, and lawyers often relied on drawing legal 
and social parallels between Loving v. Virginia (1967) and early same-sex 
marriage cases such as Baehr v. Lewin (2003). The arguments of the sameness of 
race and sexuality were extremely controversial in legal discourse, though 
effective in courts. Numerous scholars published articles in the years surrounding 
the Baehr case disputing similarities and differences between race and sexuality 
in law and society. The questions scholars raised were as follows: How should the 
Loving decision be interpreted and should it apply to same-sex couples? How was 
race used to carve out space in American legal structure for lesbian, gay, and 
bisexual (LGB) rights?1 What was the impact of the “Loving analogy”—as it 
came to be known—in legal, political, and social contexts for LGB people as well 
as people of color? 
Ultimately the Loving analogy was successful in making progress in the 
courts to extend the protections of marriage to same-sex couples in some cases, 
culminating in the national legalization of same-sex marriage in the landmark 
case Obergefell v. Hodges (2015). But the analogy proved to be quite problematic 
outside of the courtroom. Liberal scholars either supported the use of the 
sameness argument because they accepted the analogous experiences of LGB 
people and people of color or saw the Loving analogy as a necessary argument to 
put forth in order to extend legal protection originally grounded in race. 
Conservative scholars rejected the conflation of miscegenation and same-sex 
marriage struggles by highlighting the differences between racial and sexual 
minorities, moralizing the debatet, and arguing for a strictly racial characterization 
of the Loving decision. Finally, some queer and black scholars argued that the 
social implications of the Loving analogy have had harmful effects for the social 
understandings of race and sexuality, while others argue that marriage is an 
inherently racist and heterosexist institution for which LGB people of color 
should not be advocating. There is little discursive history written about the 
Loving analogy in the early marriage equality movement, but in exploring this 
history we can see the effects of race law upon the legal regulation of marriage. 
Furthermore, by understanding the legal and cultural effects of the sameness 
argument in the early 1990s, scholars and lawyers today can amend the argument 
                                                        
1 I use lesbian, gay, and bisexual here because same-sex marriage plays out very differently in 
discussion of trans people. For the sake of brevity and focus, and because the scholarship of the 
early same-sex marriage debates marginalizes or ignores trans individuals, this paper will focus on 
cisgender sexual minorities.  
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 (or abandon it entirely) in order to ensure that they are relying on the most 
effective sociolegal strategy today. 
Constructing the Analogy 
 In Loving v. Virginia the Court struck down anti-miscegenation laws 
stating,  “there can be no doubt that the restricting of the freedom to marry solely 
because of racial classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal 
Protection Clause.”2 Because the law was restrictive based on racial 
classifications the majority applied heightened scrutiny under equal protection 
jurisprudence, resulting in the decriminalization of interracial marriage. The Court 
went on to address the issue of due process deciding that, “The freedom to marry 
has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly 
pursuit of happiness among men...the freedom to marry or not to marry a person 
of another race resides within the individual and cannot be infringed by the 
state.”3 Combining the heightened scrutiny jurisprudence of due process and 
equal protection claims, the Court decided that not only must racially restrictive 
laws fulfill a compelling state interest, but also that any law concerning the right 
to marry must receive the same level of scrutiny. 
 Nearly thirty years after the Supreme Court struck down bans on mixed-
race marriages three same-sex couples took their challenge to Supreme Court of 
Hawaii. The plaintiffs argued that the equal protection and fundamental rights due 
process precedents set in Loving should be applied to same-sex couples. In Baehr 
v. Lewin (1993) the Court decided that same-sex marriage bans violated Hawaii’s 
Equal Protection Clause due to sex-based discrimination, remanding the case to a 
lower court to ensure that the state had compelling enough interest to withstand 
heightened scrutiny.4 In this decision the Court gave legitimacy to the Loving 
analogy by applying the same equal protection jurisprudence to same-sex couples 
that was afforded to mixed-race couples in Loving. Paradoxically, The Hawaiian 
Supreme Court recognized “the state's acknowledged stewardship over the 
institution of marriage, the extent of permissible state regulation of the right of 
access to the marital relationship is subject to constitutional limitations or 
constraints.”5 Thus the Court incorporated the Loving analogy into law, but did 
                                                        
2 Loving v. Virginia 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
3 Ibid. 
4 Baehr v. Lewin (1993).  
Baehr was interpreted through the Hawaiian constitution which required strict scrutiny for laws 
that discriminated on the basis of sex, at the time federal constitutional jurisprudence was still 
developing intermediate scrutiny for sex based discrimination, see: United States v. Virgina 518 
U.S. 515 (1996), Craig v. Boren, 499 U.S. 190 (1976). For commentary on Baehr v. Lewin see 
Chauncey Why marriage, From the closet to the alter, Deitrich “The lessons of the Law: Same-Sex 
Marriage and Baehr v. Lewin.” Wolfson “Why Marriage Matters” Frank “Law and the Gay Rights 
Story” 
5 Baehr v. Lewin (1993). 
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 not extend marriage rights to same-sex couples by mitigating the due process 
claim. Though the case did not result in an immediate shift in the jurisprudence of 
marriage, Baehr gave credibility to the Loving analogy and resulted in the 
opportunity to assert this precedent in the courts.  
 
 
A Tale of Two Precedents: Due Process and Equal Protection 
Much of the legal discourse surrounding the thirtieth anniversary Loving, 
which roughly coincided with the first successful claims for same-sex marriage, 
surrounded the characterization and application of Loving v. Virginia. The 
decision rested on two areas of analysis; first, the Court decided that racially 
based restrictions violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. In interpreting this part of the decision, many scholars argued that 
Loving should be classified as a racially specific case that applied the Brown v. 
Board of Education (1954) desegregation rationale to marriage.6 However, some 
legal commentators noted that the Court also looked at the case through a due 
process lens, applying strict scrutiny to the anti-miscegenation statue for two 
reasons: the racial basis of the law which upheld white supremacy as well as the 
restriction of marriage, a fundamental human right. The characterization of the 
Loving decision as either pertaining to race or marriage was an important factor 
shaping how legal scholars conceptualized the Loving analogy and its role in the 
same-sex marriage debates. 
The main distinction between liberal and conservative views of the power 
and validity of the Loving analogy centered on how the case should be classified, 
and what legal precedent it set. Liberal commentators tended to view the Loving 
decision as a combination between equal protection of all protected categories 
(i.e. race, sex, national origin, alienage, and nonmarital parentage) and the due 
process protection of the fundamental right to marriage.7 In this view liberal 
proponents of legalizing same-sex marriage viewed the loving analogy as a 
legitimate precedential assertion that was legal justification for same-sex 
marriage. These scholars employed the Loving analogy to make claims based in 
sex-based discrimination and assert that same-sex marriage bans should receive 
heightened scrutiny.8 Using I Love Lucy as an example, Andrew Koppleman 
explained the sex-based discrimination ideology as follows: if Lucy loves Ricky, 
                                                        
6 Michael F. Higginbotham, Race Law: Cases, Commentary, and Questions Third ed. (Durham: 
Carolina Academic Press, 2010), 494. David Orgon Coolidge, “Playing the Loving Card: Same-
Sex Marriage and the Politics of Analogy,” B.Y.U Journal of Public Law 12 (1998), 217-230. 
Robert A. Destro, “Law and the Politics of Marriage: Loving v. Virginia after 30 Years 
Introduction,” Catholic University Law Review 47 (1998): 1213-1218. 
7 Kenji Yoshino, “The New Equal Protection,” Harvard Law Review 124 (2011), 756-757. 
8 I use the term “heightened” scrutiny because it was unclear what scrutiny sex-based 
discrimination would require at the time of Baehr and varied state to state. See note 4. 
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 they may marry. But if Lucy loves Ethel, she is denied marriage strictly on the 
basis of sex.9 In order to tie this to the Loving analogy, he then argued, 
“miscegenation laws discriminated on the basis of race…in order to maintain 
white supremacy. Similarly sodomy laws discriminate on the basis of sex…in 
order to impose traditional sex roles.”10 This argument would allow the courts to 
apply heightened scrutiny, as they did in Baehr, relying on the jurisprudence of 
sex-based discrimination. This argument proved to be strategically important 
because an equal protection claim based in sexual orientation would receive only 
rational review. 
In his dissent in Bowers v Hardwick (1986), which affirmed anti-sodomy 
statutes, Justice Blackmun commented on the Loving analogy and sex 
discrimination claims in LGB rights litigation. Voicing the liberal analysis of the 
Loving analogy, Blackmun wrote that “the parallel between Loving and this case 
is almost uncanny,” citing the sodomy and anti-miscegenation laws’ religious 
justifications and widespread similar regulations.11 The cases differed legally, 
however, as Loving involved the due process claim to marriage rights whereas 
Bowers involved sex acts, which did not receive due process protection in the 
Bowers case. Marriage equality cases provided a space where equal protection 
and due process could converge to incorporate same-sex couples into the 
jurisprudence put forth by Loving v. Virginia. Thus, liberals argued, racial 
arguments for equal protection and challenging white supremacist laws pertaining 
to marriage gave an example and legitimate legal framework for the recognition 
of same-sex marriage.  
  Conservative pundits vehemently opposed the liberal validation of the 
Loving analogy and wrote extensively on the topic throughout the 1990s. Indeed, 
in November 1997 The Catholic University of America, the Howard University 
School of Law, and the J. Reuben Clack School of Law at Brigham Young 
University sponsored a conference called “Law and the Politics of Marriage: 
Loving v. Virginia After 30 Years.”12 Out of this conference came a flood of 
articles and scholarship that denounced the Loving analogy as “unpersuasive,” 
“superficial,” and “inapposite.”13 Conservatives typically relied on the 
characterization of the Loving decision as exclusively racial and based in equal 
protection, ignoring or dismissing the due process arguments of marriage as a 
fundamental human right. For example, Robert Destro maintained that the 
                                                        
9 Andrew Koppleman, “Why Discrimination against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex 
Discrimination,” New York University Law Review, 69 (1994): 197. 
10 Koppleman, Andrew “The miscegenation analogy: Sodomy law as sex discrimination” The Yale 
Law Journal 98 (1988): 147. 
11 Bowers v. Hardwick, 487 U.S. 211 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
12 Destro, “Law and the Politics of Marriage,” 1218. 
13 Richard F. Duncan, “From Loving to Romer: Homosexual Marriage and Moral Discernment,” 
Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law 12 (1998): 240-251. 
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 argument that Loving could be applied to what he called “homosexual ‘marriage’” 
strayed from the fundamentally racial aspect of the case.14 Another scholar argued 
that the decision in Loving was aimed at erasing the white supremacist vestiges of 
eugenics and promoting integration, to appropriate the equal protection 
jurisprudence of the case and apply it to same-sex marriage was antithetical to the 
intent of the Loving. In fact, he claimed that mixed-sex marriages resulted in an 
effective integration of the sexes.15 In this line of reasoning, mixed-sex marriages 
maintained the intent of the Loving decision by promoting integration of the 
sexes, treating both equally, whereas same-sex marriages are innately 
segregationist, the very characteristic that the Loving decision overturned. These 
claims maintained that race-based classifications are different and irreconcilable 
with sex-based discrimination while focusing on equal protection jurisprudence. 
At the same time, instead of relying on an equal protection analysis of Loving, 
some conservative scholars directly disputed the due process claim to marriage 
and the meaning of the Loving analogy as a whole. 
Though many conservative commentators relied upon the omission of a 
definitive decision on the due process claims to same-sex marriages in Baehr to 
deny application of strict scrutiny to same-sex marriage, one scholar used the due 
process claim to strengthen his counter-argument to the Loving analogy. David 
Orgon Coolidge discussed the Loving analogy as an inappropriate politicization of 
the legal debate. He equated the use of the analogy to “playing the race card” in 
other debates. Coolidge argued that invoking the right of interracial couples to 
marry in the early same-sex marriage debate was “playing the loving card,” that is 
to say proponents who used the analogy were employing a politically charged 
tactic that was an inexact parallel.16 In Coolidge’s argument, the analogy 
“invoke[d] race, civil rights, and the freedom to marry while simultaneously 
painting one’s opponents as the Bull Connors of the 1990s.”17 In this analysis 
proponents of the Loving analogy were drawing on existing tensions and an 
emotionally charged issue in order to evoke civil rights-based sympathy and 
disarm opponents. Coolidge denounced the analogy as “a subtle way of telling 
people that they are no different than a bunch of Jim Crow racists, and ought to be 
ashamed of themselves—so ashamed that they should get out of the way and 
leave the definition of marriage to the courts.”18  In this analysis one can see that 
in Coolidge’s view, those who were against same-sex marriage were protecting 
the definition of marriage rather than maintaining heterosexual dominance. 
                                                        
14 Destro, “Law and the Politics of Marriage,” 1216-1222. 
15 Duncan “Homosexual Marriage and moral Discernment,” 243-244. 
16 Coolidge, “Playing the Loving Card,” 201-205. 
17 Ibid, 201. 
18 Ibid, 205. Emphasis added 
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 Indeed, Coolidge’s primary concern was the definition of marriage, and he 
used this technical argument to strike down the due process claims central to the 
Loving analogy. He reasoned that while Loving extended the existing legal 
institution of marriage to interracial couples, the legalization of same-sex 
marriage would require a redefinition of the institution of marriage altogether.19 
His view of same-sex marriage as a radical departure from the traditional legal 
definition meant that same-sex couples were not fighting for marriage but 
something else entirely, and that something was not protected under due process 
jurisprudence. This point was underscored by the fact that Coolidge referred to 
same-sex marriage by placing “marriage” in quotation marks, as if to question or 
even mock the idea that marriage could be extended to same-sex couples. In this 
way, conservative scholars were able to call upon the definition of marriage in 
order to reject due process claims to same-sex marriages. However, the Loving 
analogy was not confined to law reviews or the courtroom; though much of the 
discourse surrounding the Loving analogy was entrenched in legal interpretation 
and meaning, there were social arguments surrounding the controversial use of the 
analogy. 
Morality and Critiques of the Loving Analogy 
Though much of the discourse comparing and contrasting race and 
sexuality took place in strictly legal discussions, law exists within social context 
and often gives institutional power to social norms and understandings. Race and 
sexuality are sociolegal fictions, themselves; that is to say that they are social 
constructions that are validated and given meaning by law.20 Therefore legal 
theorists often discussed social norms, specifically morality, when considering the 
parallels and discrepancies of race and sexual orientation. Liberal commentators 
tended to cite similarities between the moral dissidents of mixed-race and same-
sex couples. Josephine Ross, for example, compared the two in order to lend 
credibility to the Loving analogy. She began her analysis by citing cases of the 
sexualization of interracial couples at the time of the Loving case to that of same-
sex relationships in the early 1990s.21  Ross explained that this sexualization 
meant that the love of mixed-race couples in the 1970s was seen as pornographic 
and inherently tied to subversive sex, which was mirrored by same-sex 
relationships in the early 1990s, thus devaluating those relationships and their 
love. Furthermore, Ross argued, parents and outsiders reacted to same-sex 
                                                        
19 Ibid, 220. 
20 Michael Foucault, The History of Sexuality (New York: Random House, 1990), Higgenbotham 
Race Law: Cases, Commentary, and Questions, 2-99, Siobhan B. Somerville, Queering the Color 
Line: Race and the Invention of Homosexuality in American Culture (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2000). 
21 Josephine Ross, “The Sexualization of Difference: A comparison of Mixed-Race and Same-
Gender Marriage,” Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 37 (2002): 255-288. 
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 couples and mixed-race couples in similar ways. In both situations studies showed 
that parents often asked what they did wrong and mourned the real or perceived 
loss of familial status. Outsiders influenced both mixed-race and same-sex 
couples by reacting with real or threatened violence, resulting in “closeted” 
relationships.22 Liberal proponents of the Loving analogy lent credibility to the 
parallels between racial and sexual discrimination in the courtroom by 
comparable lived experiences of racism and heterosexism. 
Conservative commentators, however, used similar social applications to 
invoke morality in order to discredit the Loving analogy. These arguments 
implicitly relied upon the idea that race is a social classification forced upon 
someone through a structure of legal taxonomies whereas sexuality is either 
pathological, chosen, or the result of moral failings. Richard F. Duncan argued 
that “Loving is a case in which public morality triumphed over social 
pathology.”23 His view was that the social and legal manifestations of white 
supremacy were a moral failing; the Court overcame this failing by striking down 
racialized measures criminalizing mixed-race marriages. However, individuals 
who were morally flawed were appropriating the jurisprudence put forth in 
Loving. Duncan warned “The legacy of Loving is threatened today by those who 
seek to use the courts to accomplish a radical and dangerous agenda—the 
reordering of marriage to reflect the alleged equal goodness of homosexuality and 
heterosexuality.”24 Notice his underlying judgment that heterosexuality is good 
and homosexuality is not, thus moralizing the argument. Therefore, Duncan 
argued that while Loving was a moral triumph over social perversion, the Loving 
analogy was an immoral appropriation of this righteous ruling resulting in a moral 
threat to society and law.  
The societal ideal of sexual choice rather than identity had legal 
ramifications as well. The Ninth Circuit Court’s Decision in High Tech Gays v 
Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office (1990) was a clear example of the 
legal consequences of perceived sexual choice. The Court stated, “Homosexuality 
is not an immutable characteristic, it is behavioral and hence fundamentally 
different from traits such as race, gender or alienage…The behavior or conduct 
of such already recognized classes is irrelevant to their identification.”25 This 
jurisprudence legitimized moral judgments of homosexuality as a character flaw 
or immoral behavior and codified it into law. When judges dismissed sexual 
identity and promoted the idea of behavior, they rejected any possibility of equal 
                                                        
22 Ross, “The Sexualization of Difference,” 274-278. 
23 Duncan “Homosexual Marriage and Moral Discernment,” 239. 
24 Ibid. Emphasis added. 
25 High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office quoted in Walther Frank Law 
and the Gay Rights Story: The Long Search for Equal Justice in a Divided Democracy (New 
Brunswik: Rutgers, 2014), 104. Emphasis added. 
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 protection jurisprudence extending to LGB people. Further, when equal protection 
was denied to LGB people on moral grounds, it inhibited the use of the Loving 
analogy, and rendered it obsolete in court. Though many liberal and conservative 
commentators were discussing the impact of social understandings on law, many 
leftist queer, and black scholars argued that the employment of the analogy in the 
court room had detrimental social implications. 
 
 
Is The Loving Analogy Racist? 
 Often, while white lawyers, scholars, and LGB individuals employed the 
Loving analogy to further the marriage equality struggle, radical queer and black 
scholars denounced this trend as a harmful appropriation and a specifically white 
goal.26 When discussing the pitfalls of the Loving analogy as employed in the 
early 1990s many queer and black scholars pointed to the fact that the comparison 
had very problematic effects on the public perception of the intersections of race 
and sexuality. Some leftist commentators argued that the analogy was overly 
simplistic because it ignored intersectionality while others argued that marriage 
itself was a racist institution that LGB people should not fight for. These critiques 
appeared in multiple law reviews, though they were marginalized by the 
normative, legalistic debates outlined above. 
One of the major critiques leftist scholars put forth was that the Loving 
analogy construed racial minorities and sexual minorities as mutually exclusive 
groups, erasing queer people of color entirely. For example, one queer legal 
scholar argued, “Specifically, the comparative approach marginalizes (or treats as 
nonexistent) gays and lesbians of color, leading to a narrow construction of the 
gay and lesbian community as largely upper-class and white.”27 This 
characterization of the LGB community as largely white reinforced the mutually 
exclusive categories of racial minorities and sexual minorities while 
simultaneously ignoring those who identified with both groups. Not only was this 
construction a misrepresentation, but it also resulted in harmful ideologies, which 
perpetuated racism and heterosexism, to permeate conversations of race and 
sexuality. 
                                                        
26 I use the term “queer” to describe these scholars as that identity and the field of Queer Theory is 
often more radical and leftist, separating from the liberal/conservative dichotomy used by many 
white LGB commentators. For more on Queer Theory and its radical approaches against 
mainstream gay rights see Against Equality: Queer Revolution Not Mere Inclusion, ed. Ryan 
Conrad (Oakland: AK Press) 2014, That’s Revolting: Queer Strategies for Resisting Assimilation, 
ed. Mattilda Bernstein Sycamore (Berkeley: Soft Skull Press) 2004, and Cathy J. Cohen “Punks, 
Bulldaggers, and Welfare Queens: The Radical Potential of Queer Politics?” GLQ: A Journal of 
Lesbian and Gay Studies 3 (1997):437-456. 
27 Darren Laenard Hutchinson, “’Gay Rights’ for ‘Gay Whites?’?: Race, Sexual Identity, and 
Equal Protection Discourse,” Cornell Law Review 85 (2000): 1360. 
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 The construction of mutually exclusive categories of race and sexuality led 
to harmful assumptions by straight people of color and white LGB people. Queer 
legal scholar, Catherine Smith argued, that the assertion of sameness between 
people of color and LGB people had two negative consequences. First, the 
analogy allowed “white LGBT people to deny the white privilege and racism of 
white people generally and of themselves as members of the white majority.”28 
The Loving analogy, therefore, ignored the fact that many LGB people benefitted 
from their white privilege, instead creating the idea that all forms of oppression 
(racism, sexism, heterosexism, etc.) were experienced in the same way. Second, it 
ignored the fact that straight people of color could be homophobic and experience 
heterosexual privilege, preventing empathetic connections between straight 
people of color and white LGB people. In this view, the Loving analogy, in fact, 
alienated people of color from supporting LGB rights as it placed them in direct 
opposition to the gay community. Smith argued that a conversation about the 
Loving analogy “descends into a sameness-difference debate, reinforces white 
racism, and overlooks heterosexist and sexist stereotypes.”29 Though the Loving 
analogy was important in the courtroom, the social impact of the argument was 
detrimental to the possible alliance of straight people of color and white LGB 
people to fight systematic oppression as a whole. Though some queer 
commentators were discussing the pitfalls of using the sameness argument, others 
were saying that marriage equality itself was more problematic than the rhetorical 
tools gay rights advocates employed to achieve it. 
Black queer radicals sometimes argued that same-sex marriage as a goal 
was a racist objective that white LGB people used to obtain more systematic 
privilege. Scholars often argued that same-sex marriage privileged a white 
supremacist version of family over the traditional and cultural definition claimed 
by many black families. For example Mattie Udora Richardson cited the historical 
trend of casting black families as pathological and dysfunctional, focusing on 
the1965 Department of Labor assessment known as the Moynihan Report.30 
Richardson states, “Marriage has been used against African American people, 
held as an impossible standard of two-parent nuclear household that pathologizes 
the extended families that are integral to African ancestral and African American 
cultural lives.”31 Same-sex marriage would only maintain this privileged ideal of 
family including only two people and their children, excluding the black family of 
extended kin networks by assimilating same-sex couples to a white, heterosexist 
definition of family. The fact that marriage equality had moved to the forefront of 
                                                        
28 Catherine Smith “Queer as Black Folk?” Wisconsin Law Review 379 (2007): 389. 
29 Smith “Queer as Black Folk?” 391. 
30 Kenyon Farrow, “Is Gay Marriage Anti-Black???” in Against Equality: Queer Revolution Not 
Mere Inclusion, ed. Ryan Conrad, (Oakland: AK Press, 2014): 113. 
31 Ibid, 114. 
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 the LGB rights movement showed a great disparity between the needs queer 
people of color and those of the white gay people in positions of power. 
Because of the institutional advantage that white LGB people claimed and 
the false straight-black/gay-white dichotomy, most LGBT organizations were 
overwhelming white. Therefore, organizations such as the Human Rights 
Campaign and the Log Cabin Republicans focused strictly on LGB rights, 
ignoring the effects of racism on queer people of color. One scholar noted, “With 
some exceptions, white LGBT organizations and advocates often ask much of 
black people without doing much to confront racism.”32 This alienated queer 
people of color by showing that the LGB community was fighting for their white 
brothers and sisters and leaving queer people of color outside the mainstream 
movement. Thus, not only was the Loving analogy detrimental to societal 
understandings of race and sexuality, but white LGB people employed the 
comparison to achieve an inherently white supremacist end. 
The Legacy of the Loving Analogy 
 The debate over the Loving analogy did not end with the new millennium, 
but continues to permeate same-sex marriage discourse today. Indeed, in the oral 
arguments before the United States Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges, 
which challenged the constitutionality of state same-sex marriage bans, both sides 
of the bar drew upon the Loving analogy. For example, Justice Kagan asked the 
respondents, “Now, the right to marry. We had Loving...We just said there’s a 
right to marry, that is fundamental and that everybody is entitled to it unless there 
is some good reason for the state to exclude [them]. So why shouldn’t we adopt 
the exact same understanding here?”33 In this question Justice Kagan was 
invoking the same due process arguments as liberal commentators of the 1990s. 
She then went on to dismiss the characterization of the Loving decision as strictly 
racial, instead invoking an individual liberty argument. She asked the respondent 
“And in, indeed, Loving was exactly what this case is. It’s a case which shows 
how liberty and – and equality are intertwined, wasn’t it?”34 Though the liberty 
and equality argument was less discussed in the early Loving analogy discourse, 
this demonstrates the continued invocation of the comparison in order to extend 
protections to same-sex couples. The incorporation of individual liberties and 
their entanglement to equality in this employment of the Loving analogy 
demonstrated that it was evolving to become more effective in the legal sphere. 
Throughout the oral arguments Loving was invoked ten times between the parties, 
the justices asked about its applicability, the petitioners called upon it as 
precedent as earlier liberal scholars had done, and the respondents countered this 
point with similar arguments as those used by conservatives in the 1990s.  
                                                        
32 Smith “Queer as Black Folk?” 393. 
33 Justice Elena Kagan, Obergefell v. Hodges oral arguments. April 28, 2015. 75. 
34 Ibid. 
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  The decision of the Court in Obergefell v. Hodges, penned by Justice 
Kennedy, ultimately declared same-sex marriage legal in all states. In the majority 
opinion, Kennedy drew upon Loving to support the due process jurisprudence that 
claimed marriage as a fundamental right.35 Similarly, the Court put forth that, 
“Loving did not ask about a ‘right to interracial marriage,’” but “about the right to 
marry in its comprehensive sense.’”36 In employing the loving analogy in this 
manner Kennedy ensured that this case was not considered to claim a right to 
same-sex marriage, but a right for same-sex couples to marry. He, therefore, 
disarmed the argument that there was no guarantee to “gay marriage” or that 
marriage between two people of the same sex was not “marriage” at all. As the 
opinion progressed to address the equal protection issue at hand, Kennedy took up 
the Loving analogy again, stating “In Loving the Court invalidated a prohibition 
on interracial marriage under both the Equal Protection Clause and the Due 
Process Clause. The Court first declared the prohibition invalid because of its 
unequal treatment of interracial couples.”37 Therefore, in the decision that 
effectively delegitimized bans on same-sex marriage, the majority opinion 
employed both of the key precedential arguments of the Loving analogy. In doing 
so the decision recounted many of the rhetorical and legal strategies of liberals in 
the early marriage equality debate. 
The dissenters, on the other hand, pointed to the inconsistencies between 
Obergefell and Loving. Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Scalia and Justice 
Thomas, maintained that same-sex marriage was not marriage at all, quoting 
Loving itself, because, “We later described marriage as ‘fundamental to our very 
existence and survival,’ an understanding that necessarily implies a procreative 
component.”38 Such rhetoric was quite different from earlier conservative 
condemnations of same-sex marriage. Conservatives in the early debate claimed 
that homosexuality was not an identity, but an immoral choice. The conservative 
jurisprudence in the 2015 Obergefell decision did not take up the question of 
immorality or choice and instead relied on the definition of marriage as a 
procreative union. Though the exact points of disagreement shifted over two 
decades, the need to weaken or disprove the Loving analogy remained an 
important legal issue. Thus the Loving analogy continues to permeate American 
legal culture through equal protection and due process jurisprudence in 
discussions surrounding same-sex marriage. 
The American legal structure relies upon the use of precedent and analogy, 
especially in the area of extending equal protection and due process rights to 
underrepresented groups. The use of analogy can be a powerful tool to carve out 
                                                        
35 Obergefell v. Hodges 576___ U.S. (2015), 11. 
36 Ibid, 18. 
37 Ibid, 19-20. 
38 Obergefell v. Hodges 576___ (2015), Justice Roberts Dissenting, 7. 
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 space for minority classes to gain protected status, as is the case with the Loving 
analogy. Conservative and Liberal legal scholars often debated the classification 
of Loving as equal protection of race or fundamental rights due process in order to 
discuss its applicability to the same-sex marriage cases in the early 1990’s. By 
considering race and sexuality concrete legal categorizations, these arguments 
strengthened the sociolegal fictions of race, sexuality, and marriage. The legalistic 
debates centered on the validity of the sameness argument in the courtroom, but 
conversations about the social implications of the analogy permeated the Loving 
discourse as well. 
  Because law and society are deeply intertwined and influence one another, 
many commentators were discussing the validity of the Loving analogy in the 
social sphere. While legal scholars argued about precedent, legalistic taxonomies, 
and the interpretation of the Loving decision, others were concerned with the 
effects that the analogy had on social ideologies of race and sexuality. 
Conservative scholars argued that sexuality and race could not be compared due 
to the moral implications of homosexuality and highlighted behavior over 
identity. This social understanding permeated the jurisprudence of same-sex 
marriage decisions. Queer and black scholars, however, argued that the analogy 
had harmful effects for straight people of color, white LGB people, and queer 
people of color. In this view, the use of analogy, while sometimes effective in the 
courts, was inappropriate and had adverse social effects. Finally, some queer 
black commentators claimed the goal of marriage equality itself was racially 
restrictive and served to assimilate queer people of color to an exclusively white 
family ideal. 
The Loving analogy carved out space in equal protection and due process 
jurisprudence to subsume LGB people and same-sex couples under existing legal 
protections. The comparison also conflated race and sexual minority struggles and 
shaped public understandings of race, sexuality, and the law. The arguments 
surrounding the analogy reveal the contentious debates that permeated legal and 
social discourse, while also providing an example of the deep connectedness 
between the law and society. The Loving analogy is a controversial but integral 
part of LGB legal history and continues to be a vital tool in the same-sex marriage 
jurisprudence today. 
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